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Abstract
We propose a new set of stylized facts quantifying the structure of financial markets. The key idea is to study the combined
structure of both investment strategies and prices in order to open a qualitatively new level of understanding of financial
and economic markets. We study the detailed order flow on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange of China for the whole year of
2003. This enormous dataset allows us to compare (i) a closed national market (A-shares) with an international market
(B-shares), (ii) individuals and institutions, and (iii) real traders to random strategies with respect to timing that share
otherwise all other characteristics. We find in general that more trading results in smaller net return due to trading frictions,
with the exception that the net return is independent of the trading frequency for A-share individual traders. We unveiled
quantitative power laws with non-trivial exponents, that quantify the deterioration of performance with frequency and with
holding period of the strategies used by traders. Random strategies are found to perform much better than real ones, both
for winners and losers. Surprising large arbitrage opportunities exist, especially when using zero-intelligence strategies. This
is a diagnostic of possible inefficiencies of these financial markets.
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Introduction
Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of
evolution. This famous sentence by Theodosius Dobzhanski [1]
captures the fact that the extraordinary diversity of life can only
be understood by combining the mechanisms of genetic
evolution with historical environmental threads. Consider now
the common wisdom that, as a result of accumulated techno-
logical and financial innovations, societal and economic
networks have never been more complex and that this
complexity has reached unmanageable levels within the current
understanding and methodologies [2,3,4]. Moreover, this
complexity is often accused to be at the core origin of the
financial crisis that started in 2007, of the ensuing so-called
Great Recession and of the continuing woes of major economies
worldwide. In the spirit of Dobzhanski’s statement, we here
propose to investigate the concept that nothing in the complexity
of financial markets make sense except in the light of the
evolution of traders’ strategies and of their mutual feedback
loops. Standard approaches focus on ‘‘stylized facts’’ [5,6,7].
A stylized fact is a term used in economics to refer to a simplified
presentation of empirical findings that are so consistent (for
example, across a wide range of instruments, markets and time
periods) that they are accepted as essential constraints that
models or generating processes should strive to reproduce. Here,
rather than fixating on stylized facts, we propose to study the
combined evolution of financial patterns with the ecology of
traders feeding on them and creating them. This is analogous to
the importance of understanding the evolution of the fabric of
social networks to make sense of the dynamics of human
societies, the growth and organization of fault networks to
account for the spatio-temporal organization of earthquakes, the
structure of the brain and its plasticity to describe neural
excitations and make progress on treating epileptic seizures, and
so on. Similarly, the occurrence and severity of the financial
crisis is best understood from the perspective of the accumulation
of at least five bubbles over the last twenty years [8] associated
with a climate of complacency everywhere and the illusion of the
‘‘great moderation’’ [9].
The view that financial markets can be better understood as
adaptive ecologies of co-evolving traders is not new. It has been
explored in agent-based models [10,11,12,13,14,15] and articu-
lated in the so-called ‘‘adaptive markets hypothesis’’ [16]. Here,
our contribution is to provide novel empirical evidence based on
the analysis of a unique dataset.
The logic of our approach is based on the following points.
1. Several important studies have shown that efficient allocation
can result from the aggregation of decisions made by irrational
or zero-intelligent agents under constraints [17,18,19].
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underperform the global market as well as simple buy-and-hold
strategies [20,21,22], with only very few exceptions [23].
3. The structure of markets results from the aggregate impact of
traders.
4. Here, we show that random strategies are as a rule significantly
better than even the best traders.
5. We characterize the statistical properties of trading frequency
and holding periods of traders and quantify their impact on
performance.
If most strategies were random, the conclusions are likely to be
quite different. Points 3–5 together imply that there are untapped
investment and arbitrage opportunities, that very few traders
actually profit from. This is very surprising given the ease with
which zero-intelligence traders over-perform. The quantitative
characterization of the performances of traders as a function of
a few key observable characteristics that is presented below can be
used by future prospective traders to improve their strategies. Of
course, as more traders become wiser, the market characteristics
will evolve in a way similar to the first-entry games in which
random strategies are found ultimately to dominate [24]. Our
main point is that the characterization of financial markets
requires understanding the ecology of strategies and their
characteristics and how they interact together to shape the very
patterns they exploit. Arguably, this will provide for really more
efficient and robust financial markets, designed to avoid future
systemic crises.
In this work, we perform a statistical analysis of the performance
of all the traders trading 32 A-share stocks and 11 B-share stocks
on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange of China in 2003. This market
offers a unique opportunity to compare (i) a closed national market
(A-shares) with an international market (B-shares), (ii) individuals
and institutions and (iii) real traders to random strategies with
respect to timing that share otherwise all other characteristics.
The analysis is conducted separately for A-shares and B-shares.
The database contains the information of each order including (i)
the masked ID of the trader, (ii) whether he is an individual or
institution, (iii) the direction, (iv) the price, (v) the size of the order,
and (vi) the time stamps accurate to 0.01 second [25]. The
evolution of the A-share index and the B-share index is shown in
Fig. 1. Interestingly, the indices are found to be outperformed by
the 1=N portfolio strategy [26]. We find that the net return of
A-share individual traders is negative and independent of the
trading frequency, while that of A-share institutional traders,
B-share individual traders and B-share institutional traders
decreases with increasing trading frequency. In addition, the net
return decreases for winners and increases for losers when the
trading frequency increases. We also find that random trading
performs better for all individuals and institutions and for all
winners. We show that the performance of traders exhibit non-
trivial power law dependence as a function of trading frequency
and holding periods.
The invisible hand with zero-intelligence agents
Since Adam Smith’s famous ‘‘invisible hand’’ description of
economic and financial markets as self-regulating systems,
economics has been dominated by the paradigm of rational utility
maximizing agents. Given restrictive conditions, the agents’
collective actions are found in theory to lead to stable general
equilibrium points that are characterized by optimal allocation of
resources. However, starting with H. Simon, and expanding with
the work of D. Kahneman and A. Tversky as well as many other
scientists, the severe limitations of human cognition and the many
biases in real people’s decisions have been pointed out. These
limitations and biases a priori cast doubts on the relevance of
rational utility theory. In reply, many studies have shown that
irrational households can lead in aggregate to rational markets. In
particular, Gode and Sunder [17] used ‘‘zero-intelligence’’
computer agents (who do not seek or maximize profits, do not
observe, remember, or learn) to simulate market transactions in
a double auction. They found that a population of such agents,
subjected to budget constraint, produced results that closely
mirrored the allocation efficiency of a simultaneous experimental
human exchange. Studying prediction markets, Othman [18]
confirmed recently that prices that replicate the findings of
empirical market studies can emerge from a market populated by
inhuman zero-intelligence agents with diffuse beliefs. Farmer et al.
[19] developed a model of zero-intelligent agents that explains a
large part of the cross-sectional properties of stocks traded in
continuous double auction markets. They suggest that constraints
imposed by market institutions may at times dominate strategic
agent behavior, so that random agents with constraints perform on
the whole as well as their more human siblings.
Underperformance and the illusion of control
In both single-player and multiplayer Parrondo games, two or
more losing games when alternated periodically or randomly yield
Figure 1. Time series. The daily evolution of Shenzhen Component indexes for A-shares and B-shares in 2003 and the performance of their
1=N portfolios, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0024391.g001
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is introduced, the Parrondo games produce degraded rather than
enhanced returns [31,24]. This ‘‘illusion of control’’ phenomenon
is present in other agent-based models whose design is inspired by
stock markets [32]. The conventional wisdom states that
institutions markedly outperform individuals because they are
more informed [33]. However, the performance of both
professionals and laymen is often documented to be worse than
chance [34,21,22,20]. Even worse, there is evidence showing that
analysts’ stock recommendation records are intentionally rewritten
to a large extent [35]. Indeed, the performance of claimed
successful strategies should be tested based on the method of
random strategies, that are designed to remove survival and look-
ahead biases [36].
The phenomenon of ‘‘Illusion of control’’ is one possible form of
overconfidence. Overconfidence of stock market participants is
expected to cause traders to trade more [37,38], which has been
confirmed at the market and individual equity level [39] and at the
individual level [40,41,42]. In addition, there is evidence that the
higher the frequency of trading, the poorer is the performance
[43,44,33,45].
Materials and Methods
Data sets
The Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) was established on
December 1, 1990 and started its operations on July 3, 1991. It
contains two independent markets, A-share market and B-share
market. The former is composed of common stocks which are
issued by mainland Chinese companies. It is opened only to
domestic traders, and traded in CNY. The latter is also issued by
mainland Chinese companies, while it is traded in Hong Kong dollar
(HKD). It was restricted to foreign traders before February 19,
2001, and since then it has been opened to Chinese traders as well.
At the end of 2003, there were 491 A-share stocks and 57 B-share
stocks listed on the SZSE. In the year 2003, the opening call
auction is held between 9:15 am and 9:25 am, followed by the
cooling periods from 9:25 am to 9:30 am, and the continuous
auction operating from 9:30 am to 11:30 am and 13:00 pm to
15:00 pm.
Our analysis is based on a database recording the order flows of
43 liquid stocks extracted from the A-share market and the
B-share market on the SZSE in the whole year of 2003 when
the close call auction was adopted in the opening procedure. The
trading system did not show any information about the order
flows, and traders submitted orders only according to the closing
price of the last trading day. In the present work, we study
a database in which, for each stock, all trading activities of all
traders buying and selling the stock in the year 2003 are recorded.
The database contains the price, size and associated time of each
submitted order with the time stamps accurate to 0.01 second.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the two indexes.
Method
Assume that there are I traders, each of them labeled i, and
there are S stocks in the database under investigation, each labeled
s. For trader i and stock s, we can construct a sequence of buy/sell
activities, denoted A(i,s):
A(i,s)~
v1,v2,   ,vj,   ,vJs
p1,p2,   ,pj,   ,pJs
t1,t2,   ,tj,   ,tJs
2
6 4
3
7 5, ð1Þ
which means that trader i buys vj shares of stock s with price pj at
time tj when vjw0 or trader i sells {vj shares of stock s with price
pj at time tj when vjv0. Obviously, there are no zero vj among all
entries.
In order to construct A(i,s), we need to reconstruct the order
book. Assume that trader i places a limit order of size V at time t,
which is executed later by k other effective market orders with
sizes V1,V2,   ,Vk with prices P1,P2,   ,Pk at times
T1,T2,   ,Tk. Then, we record only one entry (vj,pj,tj), where
pj~
1
V
X k
m~1
VmPm, vj~V, tj~Tk: ð2Þ
This is very important in the calculation of transaction costs,
defined soon. More operations are needed for A(i,s) in order to
make sure that
X Js
j~1
vj~0: ð3Þ
First, if there are several sell transactions without any preceding
buy transactions, these sells should not be included in A(i,s). This
is equivalent to treating the traders as new comers in 2003.
Otherwise, we are unable to precisely calculate the earnings or the
losses, since we do not know the price paid the trader when she
entered the position at a time outside the year 2003, which is
covered by our database. In the case of positions entered before
2003, if we would assume that the trader bought the stock right
after the market opened on 2 January 2003, the calculated net
return would be biased in general towards much higher values due
to the rebound occurring around the beginning of 2003. Our
results would be biased by the effective foresight given to the
traders. In other words, this would correspond to giving the traders
ex-ante forecasting abilities. We thus avoid such look-ahead bias
[36] by removing sells without prior buys. Second, at the end of
the year 2003, if trader i holds some shares of stock s, we added a
new entry by including a fictitious transaction selling all his shares.
This amounts to characterizing her position on a book-to-market
basis at the end of our database.
This preprocess can be described in detail as follows. Assume
that the initial array of transaction sizes for a trader trading a stock
in 2003 is ~ v v(0)~fv
(0)
1 ,v
(0)
2 ,   ,v
(0)
N g, where N is the number of
transactions. We then perform Nz1 steps of operation. At the
first step, if v
(0)
1 v0 (for a sell), then v1 is discarded from ~ v v0 as
discussed above, and the first element of the resulting array
~ v v(1)~fv
(1)
1 ,v
(1)
2 ,   ,v
(1)
N g is updated and we have
v
(1)
k ~
0, k~1
v
(0)
k , k=1
 
: ð4Þ
Otherwise, if v1w0, we have~ v v(1)~~ v v(0). At the jth step after there is
at least one element v
(j{1)
k being positive for kvjƒN,i f
Pj
k~1 v
(j{1)
k v0, we have
v
(j)
k ~
{
P j{1
i~1
v
(j{1)
i , k~j
v
(j{1)
k , k=j
8
> <
> :
, ð5Þ
which forms the updated array~ v v(j)~fv
(j)
1 ,v
(j)
2 ,   ,v
(j)
N g. Otherwise,
we have~ v v(j)~~ v v(j{1). These N steps of operation is to ensure that
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k~1
vk§0 ð6Þ
for all j[½1,Ji . At the (Nz1)th step, if
Pj
k~1 v
(j{1)
k w0, we add
a sell to the end of the array:
v
(Nz1)
k ~
v
(N)
k , kƒN
{
P N
i~1
v
(N)
i , k~Nz1
8
> <
> :
: ð7Þ
To reduce computational time, we only need to perform these
operations on sells. After discarding all zeros in~ v v(Nz1), we obtain
the first row of A(i,s).
For the j-th transaction (or equivalently the j-th entry), the
trading volume is pjvj. According to the Shenzhen Stock Exchange
Trading Rules released in 2001, the transaction cost is determined
as follows:
cj~maxfjpjvjj(bizezf),5gzH({vj)jpjvjjd, ð8Þ
where H(vj) is the Heaviside function. The four terms in Eq. (8)
are the following: (i) Brokerage bi, which should be less than 0.3%;
(ii) Exchange fee e~0:01475% for A-shares and e~0:0301% for
B-shares for both buy and sell sides; (iii) Supervision fee
f~0:004% for both buy and sell sides; and (iv) Stamp duty
d~0:1% for sellers only (explaining the presence of the Heaviside
function H({vj) in expression (8)). The sum of bizezf should
be less than 0.3% with a minimum of 5 CNY for A-shares and 5
HKD for B-shares for both buy and sell sides. Note that bi is
i-specific and independent of stock s.
Therefore, the total invested capital (the money that trader
i spent to buy stock s)i sBi,s~
P
vjw0 vjpj and the transaction cost
of trader i buying stock s is Cb
i,s~
P
vjw0 cj. The total capital
obtained by selling all the shares of stock s is Si,s~{
P
vjv0 vjpj
and the transaction cost of trader i selling stock s is Cs
i,s~
P
vjv0 cj.
The total transaction cost of trader i in his investment of stock s is
Ci,s~Cb
i,szCs
i,s, ð9Þ
The total earning is
Ei,s~Si,s{Bi,s{Ci,szDi,s, ð10Þ
where Di,s is the dividend received by agent i from stock s over the
one period. The portfolio return of trader i can be calculated as
follows
Ri~
X S
s~1
Ei,s=
X S
s~1
Bi,sz
X S
s~1
Cb
i,s
 !
: ð11Þ
The number of transactions (frequency of trading) is the sum of all J
values of trader i
Ji~
X S
s~1
Js, ð12Þ
where Js denotes how many times trader i bought and sold stock s,
as implicitly defined in Eq. (1).
We note that the calculated invested capital in Eq. (11) could be
larger than the real value, which will cause an underestimation of
the absolute value of the return, although the net earning is
accurate. However, it is hard to determine the true invested capital
since we do not have any information about how much money the
traders had in their accounts and whether they had added or
withdrawn money from their accounts.
Results
Basic statistics
In our database, there are 2,330,093 A-share traders with
2,315,664 individuals and 135,086 B-share traders with 88,779
distinct individuals. It is found that the proportion of institutional
traders is much higher in the B-share market (34.28%) than in the
A-share market (0.62%). We choose to classify traders into
‘‘winners’’ and ‘‘losers’’ rather than ‘‘above-average’’ and ‘‘below-
average’’, or ‘‘upper half’’ and ‘‘lower half’’, because we believe
that this reflects the behavioral fact that traders care essentially
about whether they are winning or losing money. Therefore, the
statistics based on winners and losers are likely to better represent
the distributions of results, as they reflect the natural target as well
as metrics set by traders. For each trader i, we calculate his
portfolio return Ri. For A-share traders, 51.95% individuals and
68.50% institutions are net winners above the zero benchmark.
For B-share traders, 85.76% individuals and 93.83% institutions
are winners above the zero benchmark. These numbers are
presented in Table 1.
To have a full understanding of how many of the traders are
really performing, the box plots of returns for each type of traders
in each market are given in Fig. 2. Some interesting observations
are obtained.
N The proportion of winning traders in the B-share market is
much higher than in the A-share market. This may be
associated with the fact that the B-share index gained a much
higher annual return than the A-share index (see Fig. 1).
Passive or even under-performing agents perform better on an
absolute basis, the higher the upward trend of the underlying
market.
N In both markets, the winning proportion of institutional traders
is much higher than retail traders, which is consistent with
recent results found for the Taiwan market [33].
N In each market, individual traders may gain higher returns
than institutions or incur greater losses when the performance
is the best or the worst (see the maxima and minima in Fig. 2).
Trading frequency and return
Figure 3 shows the dependence of the average returns R as
a function of the trading frequency J for A-share individuals (a),
Table 1. Numbers of all traders, winners and losers in the two
markets.
A-shares B-shares
Individual Institution Individual Institution
All traders 2,316,392 14,435 88,805 46,312
Winning traders 1,196,515 9,866 76,136 43,355
Losing traders 1,119,877 4,569 12,669 2,957
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0024391.t001
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institutions (d), respectively. One can observe that the return is
statistically independent of the trading frequency for A-share
individuals while, in the three other cases, R decreases
systematically with J, indicating that trading is hazardous to
traders’ wealth not only for individuals but also for institutions
[44]. Since the numbers of institutional traders trading A-shares
and B-Shares are relatively small, as shown in Table 1, the results
for institutions have larger fluctuations. Moreover, the increase of
R for large J in Fig. 3(d) is not statistically significant since there
were fewer foreign institutions conducting frequent transactions.
Comparing the returns with the same trading frequency,
institutions outperform individuals.
We also investigate the dependence of the net return as
a function of trading frequency for two categories of traders, the
winners and the losers. Winners (respectively losers) are defined as
those having a positive (respectively negative) return. The
classification is thus performed on an absolute (and not relative)
basis. Figure 3 shows that return decreases with trading frequency
for winners and increases for losers. The enhanced performance of
losers by increasing trading frequency cannot be explained by
a learned overconfidence bias as described in Refs. [37,38].
Figure 3 also presents the average returns that random trading
would yield in these markets. Random strategies are generated by
considering each trader individually in turn, choosing random
times for their trades while otherwise keeping fixed all other
characteristics such as his number of transactions (trading
frequency) and the trade sizes on each stock. Specifically, in Eq.
(1), for a given trader i and a stock s, the variables Js and
vj,j~1,   ,Js are unchanged, while the times tj,j~1,   ,Js are
replaced by a randomly chosen time sequence. As a result, the
prices pj are also changed. This is done 2000 times for each trader,
generating overall a very large number synthetic outputs
contributed over all the traders in our database. For a given
frequency J, we sort again these many outputs into two classes: (i)
the winners are the random strategies with a positive return; (ii) the
losers are the random strategies with a negative return. We then
compute separately the average returns (and their standard
deviation) of the winning and of the losing random strategies, as
well as the overall average return of these random strategies. Note
that this construction of random strategies tests specifically the
skills of traders with respect to timing, since all the other
Figure 2. Box plots of the returns in four classes. The four plots
are for individual A-share traders, institutional A-share traders,
individual B-share traders, and institutional B-share traders. For each
box plot, the minimum, lower quartile, median, upper quartile, and
maximum of each class of returns are given.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0024391.g002
Figure 3. Dependence of the average return R on the trading frequency J. Performance comparison of strategic trading (real data) and
random trading using the average values of return R versus trading frequency J. We exclude the sell transactions without any preceding matching
buys. The simulations for the random strategies are repeated for 2000 times. We show the results for individuals in A-share (a), institutions in A-share
(b), individuals in B-share (c) and institutions in B-share (d), respectively. In each plot, the colored symbols (black 0 for all traders, red D for winners and
green + for losers) correspond to strategic trading, the continuous lines (black line for all traders, red line for winners and green line for losers)
correspond to random trading, and the dashed line indicates the base line of zero return (R~0).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0024391.g003
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Fig. 3, the aggregate net return of random trading (black lines) is
higher than that of real trading (black circles) with the same
trading frequency in every case. More impressively, the aggregate
net returns of A-share individuals are negative, while the net
returns using random trading strategy are positive. Two closely
related conclusions can be drawn: (i) real trading is not random
but strategic; (ii) the performance of strategic trading is worse than
random trading. For the winners, random trading also induces
higher return than real strategic trading in all four cases. For losers
in the A-share market, random trading performs slightly worse.
For losers in the B-share market, the random trading and real
trading yield almost identical net returns.
Holding time and return
We now study the influence of the holding time Dt, defined as
the average of the elapsed time between the time a trader sold a
stock and the time she bought it. In doing so, we need to identify
buy/sell pairs. For each buy, an earliest sell with the same size is
found to form a pair. If the size of the earliest sell is smaller than
that of the buy, we need more sells to match the buy and the
selling time is the average of all the associated time instants. The
first row of A(i,s) is used in this calculation. Figure 4 shows the
average return R as a function of the average holding time Dt for
A-share individuals (a), A-share institutions (b), B-share individuals
(c) and B-share institutions (d), respectively. This figure is different
from Fig. 3 because holding time is not simply the inverse of
trading frequency. Indeed, the total holding time JDt is not
constant for different traders. In general, the aggregate net return
increases with average holding time. This is consistent with the
conventional wisdom that the buy-and-hold strategy outperforms
most other strategies (see Fig. 1 for the performance of the buy-
and-hold strategy of the 1=N portfolio). For winners, the return is
large when the holding time is long. For losers, R decreases
with respect to Dt in the A-share market and varies slightly in the
B-share market. The solid lines with error bars are the average
simulation results of random trading. For large Dt and B-shares,
we still see that random trading performs better.
Quantitative relations linking return to trading frequency
and holding period
The winners or losers (individuals or institutions in a market) are
sorted according to their trading frequencies. The averages of the
returns and holding times of each group of traders are calculated.
We plot the magnitude of the average returns for winners and for
losers as a function of the trading frequency in double logarithmic
coordinates in the first column of Fig. 5 and observe a power law
relationship
R*J{a, ð13Þ
where a~0:31+0:01 for A-share individual winners, a~0:38+0:01
for A-share individual losers, a~0:20+0:04 for A-share institutional
winners, a~0:11+0:04 for A-share institutional losers, 0:20+0:01
for B-share individual winners, 0:39+0:02 for B-share individual
losers, 0:24+0:02 for B-share institutional winners, and 0:46+0:09
for B-share institutional losers.
The power law (13) and the obtained values of the exponents a
should be compared with the prediction from the simple null
hypothesis that returns from the trading strategies are independent
and identically distributed random variables with a finite variance
(we have verified that this last condition holds in our data set). As
the returns have approximately zero mean, as shown in Fig. 3a,
the expected value of R conditional on Rw0 (or Rv0) should be
proportional to J{1=2 by the action of the Central Limit Theorem.
Thus, the null hypothesis predicts a value a~0:5. This value is
Figure 4. Dependence of the average return R on the average holding time Dt. Average returns R versus average holding time for
individuals in A-share (a), institutions in A-share (b), individuals in B-share (c) and institutions in B-share (d), respectively. The symbols present the
average values over all traders (0), as well as traders who earn positive return (red D) and negative return (green +). The dashed line delineates the
benchmark in absolute terms of zero return. The solid lines with error bars are the average simulation results of random trading for all traders (black),
winners (red) and losers (green). The insets in panels (c) and (d) are magnifications of the curves for small values of Dt.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0024391.g004
Investment Strategies Reveal New Stylized Facts
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 September 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 9 | e24391strongly rejected by our measurements, which provides one-
standard deviation error bars much smaller than the difference
between 0:5 and the measured a’s. The significantly smaller
measured values of av0:5 can be interpreted as due to the
existence of persistency in the returns obtained by the trading
strategies, the persistency being characterized by a Hurst exponent
equal to 1{a.
Similarly, the magnitude of the average return R scales with
respect to the average holding time Dt as a power law
R*Dtb, ð14Þ
and the average holding time Dt also scales with respect to the
average trading frequency J as a power law
Dt*J{c, ð15Þ
as illustrated in the second and third columns of Fig. 5. The power
laws are statistically more significant for individual traders than
institutional traders because there are many more individuals (about
99.38%) in the A-share market. The estimated exponents are listed
in Table 2. For each power-law relationship, the exponents for
winners and losers are approximately equal to each other, that is,
Ewinner,trader,market&Eloser,trader,market, ð16Þ
where E~a, b,o rc,‘‘trader’’ could be individuals or institutions,
and ‘‘market’’ could be A-shares or B-shares.
Figure 5. Power-law relationships between three variables. The first column (a,d,g,j) shows the dependence between the magnitude of the
average return R and the trading frequency J. The second column (b,e,h,k) shows the dependence between the magnitude of the average return
R and the holding time Dt. The third column (c,f,i,l) shows the dependence between the holding time Dt and the trading frequency J. The four rows
are for A-share individuals, A-share institutions, B-share individuals, and B-share institutions, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0024391.g005
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three power-law exponents
a~bc, ð17Þ
which is validated in Table 2 for most cases. A careful examination
shows that this relation between exponents does not hold in the two
cases given in Table 2 that are marked in bold face. These two cases
correspond toinstitutionaltraders.Thisdiscrepancyiscausedbythe
relatively smaller numbers of institutional traders in both the
A-share and B-Share markets, as shown in Table 1. Indeed, the
agreement is muchbetterfor individualtraders than forinstitutional
traders since there are many more individual traders.
Discussion
The original incentive of this study was to provide novel
comparative characterizations of financial markets that are based
on the realized performances of strategies implemented by traders.
The Shenzhen Stock Exchange of China offers a unique
opportunity to compare (i) a closed national market (A-shares)
with an international market (B-Shares), (ii) individuals and
institutions and (iii) real traders to random strategies with respect
to timing that share otherwise all other characteristics.
The first robust result is that more trading results in smaller net
return due to trading frictions. This is true for both individual and
institutional traders in China’s B-share market. However, the net
return of individual traders in the A-share market is independent
of the trading frequency, which is different from other markets
[43,44,33,45]. For individual or institutional winners, this result
holds again. We unveiled quantitative laws showing how the
deterioration of performance scales with frequency and with
holding period. Naively, we could have expected that the
performance is simply inversely proportional to the trading
frequency, if transaction costs was the only contribution. But
here, we find non-trivial exponents, which reveal the complexity of
the market price structure as the traders strategically adapt their
investments. The complexity of the market price structure is
partially quantified by the persistence in the strategy performance
as well as in the holding time of positions, characterized by the
exponents a and c defined by expressions (13) and (15). These
results provide a new set of stylized facts that characterize the
structure of the price patterns. In other words, the properties of the
returns obtained by different traders provide a kind of ‘‘spectros-
copy’’ of the prices. By the term ‘‘spectroscop’’, we use the analogy
with the physical technique with the same name, defined as the
study of the interaction between matter and waves. In the physical
sense of the term, in many applications, spectroscopy uses the
interaction between matter and wave to probe the former. It is in
that sense that we propose that the study of the performance of
trading strategies provide new probes and novel understanding of
financial price time series.
We also found that the return of real trading is significantly and
robustly worse than random trading. As a consequence, we can
conclude that traders do try to develop opportunistic strategies,
but zero intelligence strategies outperform them in stock trading.
Certainly, this conclusion does not deny the possibility that some
traders do perform better than random trading. Therefore, we can
use the strategy performance as a gauge or an instrument to
characterize the market structure, in addition to the its statistical
properties often referred to as the stylized facts. To the best of our
knowledge, this idea is novel. It reflects the natural consequence
that the aggregation of strategies make the stock market structure
what it is, and vice-versa the later influences and co-evolve with
the ecology of strategies [13]. The strategies implemented by
traders are not only probing the prices but also influencing the
prices so that they are both cameras and engines [46]. We believe
that the study of the combined structure of both strategies and
prices will open a qualitatively new level of understanding of
financial and economic markets.
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